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Reconciliation in a Transitional Justice Perspective
Elin Skaar, Chr. Michelsen Institute1
Elin.Skaar@cmi.no
Reconciliation is one of the most contested concepts in the
scholarly debate on transitional justice, and arguably also the
most difficult to measure empirically. This article provides an
overview and assessment of current knowledge on the
relationships between transitional justice mechanisms aimed at
promoting “truth” and “justice” and the (end) goal of
“reconciliation” in its multiple forms. It first spells out the
claims about how to foster reconciliation and about how
different mechanisms such as truth commissions, trials,
amnesties, and local justice initiatives can be expected to
contribute toward this end goal. Next, it takes stock of singlecase, comparative and broad sample impact studies of
reconciliation processes. It finds that reconciliation may be most
usefully studied as a process rather than as a goal, and that more
attention should be given to the interplay between formal and
local transitional justice processes. The article concludes that
methodological challenges for cross-country analysis include (1)
1

This article has been prepared with funding from the Chr. Michelsen
Institute’s Human Rights Programme, Bergen, Norway. I am indebted to
Jessica Schultz for invaluable research assistance on this project. I would like
to thank Trine Eide, Siri Gloppen, Ingrid Samset, Astri Suhrke, and Kari
Telle for useful input and discussions developing this article. I also thank Lise
Rakner and Eyolf Jul-Larsen for constructive comments on earlier drafts.
Finally, thanks are due to the two anonymous reviewers of Transitional Justice
Review for clarifying comments.
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 54-103

Published by Scholarship@Western, 2013

1

Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 10

55 Reconciliation in a Transitional Justice Perspective

specifying a concept of reconciliation that is narrow enough to
be measurable across cases, and (2) allowing sufficient time to go
by before measuring the impact of mechanisms that are
postulated to bring about reconciliation.
Introduction
In recent years, Kenya, the Solomon Islands, and Brazil have
joined the growing number of countries that have established
truth commissions, following the example first set by Argentina
in 1983.2 Cambodians are in the process of prosecuting the
worst human rights abusers from the Pol Pot regime of the
1970s. Spaniards are digging up mass graves stemming from the
fascist Franco regime. And donor governments are pouring
millions of dollars each year into “transitional justice” projects.3
In the past two decades, there has been an almost
unquestioned faith in the potential for transitional justice
mechanisms such as truth commissions and trials to heal and
transform wounded societies. The end goals commonly
promoted include sustainable peace, rule of law, greater
accountability, social reconstruction and a deepening of
democracy. Although substantial intellectual capacity has been
devoted to impact assessment of transitional justice in recent
2 By some accounts, the Uganda truth commission set up by dictator Idi
Amin in 1974 was the first to be set up. See United States Institute of Peace’s
Truth Commission Digital Collection,
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-digital-collection. See
also Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The
Impact on Human Rights and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2010). However,
other well informed sources do not recognize this commission, possibly
because it never issued a report.
3 According to one report, private foundations in the United States alone
invested over US$90 million in the transitional justice field between 2003 and
2007. Louis Bickford and Debra Schultz, Memory and Justice: Confronting Past
Atrocity of Human Rights Abuse (New York: International Centre for
Transitional Justice, 2008), 24, as cited in Colleen Duggan. ‘“Show me your
impact”: Evaluating Transitional Justice in Contested Spaces’, Special Issue:
‘Evaluation in Contested Spaces,’ Journal of Planning and Program Evaluation 35.1
(2010): 1.
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years, the prevailing conclusion has been that we still know very
little.4 Historically, the impact of transitional justice has been the
business of single case studies, which has limited their
generalizability. To amend this gap, in recent years a number of
statistical studies has made advances in terms of finding
plausible correlations between various transitional justice
mechanisms (principally trials, truth commissions, and amnesty
laws) on the one hand, and the various goals of transitional
justice (“peace”, “rule of law”, “democracy”, “human rights
abuses”) on the other hand.5 Although the methodologies for
assessing impact are advancing,6 there is as of yet no

4

This was the common conclusion of three general literature review studies:
Pierre Hazan, “Measuring the impact of punishment and forgiveness: A
framework for evaluating transitional justice,” International Review of the Red
Cross 88.861 (2006.): 19-47; David Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling,
and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm? ” International Studies
Review 6.3 (2004): 355-380. Oskar N. T. Thoms, James Ron, and Roland
Paris, “The effects of transitional justice mechanisms: A summary of
empirical research findings and implications for analysts and practitioners, ”
in CIPS Working Paper, Center for International Policy Studies (Ottawa, 2008), 1-91.
See also Colleen Duggan, Guest Editor, “Special Issue: Transitional Justice
on Trial—Evaluating its Impact,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3
(2010).
5 Tove Grete Lie, Helga Malmin Binningsbø, and Scott Gates, “Post-Conflict
Justice and Sustainable Peace,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4191
(Washington, D.C.: April 2007); Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling,
“The Impact of Human Rights Trials in Latin America,” Journal of Peace
Research 44.4 (2007): 427; Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining
the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional
Countries,” International Studies Quarterly 54.4 (2010): 939-963; Tricia D.
Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, eds., Transitional Justice in
Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 2010).
6 See, for example, Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, et al., eds., Assessing
the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research (Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009). See also Duggan, ‘”Show
me your impact,” for challenges and opportunities in evaluating the effects of
transitional justice programs, though not the impact of the TJ mechanisms
themselves on any given societal process or goal.
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comprehensive analytical framework for assessing the impact of
transitional justice mechanisms.
In particular, there is a huge gap in our empirical
knowledge with respect to what transitional justice may or may
not do for reconciliation. “Reconciliation” has emerged as a
specific goal of many transitional justice processes. But there is
still much debate about the meaning of the term, and little
empirical evidence of how different transitional justice
mechanisms may affect achievement of this desired outcome.
The bulk of impact assessment studies on reconciliation are
single-case studies, which although may be superbly conducted
have relatively limited value in terms of generalization. Indeed, I
am not aware of any joint impact assessment of multiple
transitional justice mechanisms employed in a given country to
advance reconciliation. Nor I am aware of any cross-country
analysis that systematically tries to assess the impact of a single
mechanism, such as trials or truth commissions, on
reconciliation.7 Finally, no existing statistical study has attempted
to gauge the impact of transitional justice mechanisms on
reconciliation. This is where the scholarly knowledge on how
transitional justice processes may affect reconciliation stands at
the moment.
The modest aim of this article is therefore to assess the
current scholarly knowledge about the relationships between
transitional justice mechanisms and reconciliation. The rest of
this article is divided into three parts. The first part provides a
short overview of a selection of the many meanings and
definitions of the two central concepts “transitional justice” and
“reconciliation”, simply to point out some of the multiple ways

7

A few cross-country analyses of a small number of cases exist for single
mechanism, which provide very useful insights, empirically as well as
methodologically—though these studies do not measure impact on
reconciliation. For the impact of truth commissions, see Eric WiebelhausBrahm, “Uncovering the Truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and
Impact,” International Studies Perspectives 8.1 (2007): 16-35; Wiebelhaus-Brahm,
Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies.
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that reconciliation as a concept has been understood and used in
the scholarly literature on transitional justice.
The second part evaluates claims commonly made about
the relationships between four key transitional justice
mechanisms—trials, truth commissions, amnesties, and local
justice processes—and reconciliation.8 Though many scholars
before me have examined the various claims of transitional
justice, this article is the first to systematically examine the claims
with respect to reconciliation specifically. I find that there is
little scholarly agreement on what and how these four
transitional justice mechanisms are meant to contribute to
reconciliation (in its many diverse forms). Along with presenting
the claims, I also examine some of the existing empirical
research on the impact of these selected transitional justice
mechanisms on reconciliation. The overarching question is to
what extent there is empirical support for claims that societies
that formally address past human rights violations have a better
chance to reconcile after conflict than those that do not.
Drawing on a non-exhaustive selection of findings from the
growing body of single-case, comparative, and broad sample
impact studies, I note that evidence is unevenly spread across
cases, sparse, frequently conflicting, and at times highly
contested.
The third part maps out some methodological challenges for
future research on transitional justice and reconciliation and
presents tentative suggestions of how to address these
challenges. The two main methodological challenges to
systematic comparative empirical research on how transitional
justice mechanisms may affect reconciliation processes seem to
be (1) to specify a concept of reconciliation that is narrow
8

Due to limits of space, we focus on these four key mechanisms rather than
on the full range of transitional justice responses, which also include, inter
alia, reparations, social shaming, lustration (banning of perpetrators from
public office), vetting processes, public access to police records, public
apologies, reburial of victims, literary and historical writings, and memorials.
See Siri Gloppen, “Reconciliation and Democratisation: Outlining the
Research Field,” Report no. 5, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, 2000.
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enough to be measurable across cases, and (2) to allow sufficient
time to go by before measuring impact of the mechanisms that
are postulated to bring about reconciliation.
Defining transitional justice and reconciliation

Defining transitional justice
Though the roots of transitional justice stretch back much
further, the concept was first coined by Ruti Teitel in 1991.9 She
defined transitional justice as “the conception of justice
associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal
responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor
regimes” (emphasis added).10 Teitel’s definition emphasises the
international legal duty to prosecute genocide, war crimes and
crimes against humanity, a perspective grounded in midtwentieth-century developments in human rights law. This
definition has since been broadened, both in terms of the
possible responses to violence and in terms of the desired
outcomes of these responses.
According to the UN Secretary General, transitional
justice “comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms
associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a
9

See Ruti Teitel, “Editorial Note: Transitional Justice Globalized,”
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2.1 (2008):1-4. Another well-cited early
user of the concept “transitional justice” is Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice.
How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes, vols. I-III (Washington
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995). See also Jon Elster,
Closing The Books: Transitional Justice In Historical Perspective (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
10 Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal
16 (Spring 2003): 1. In her earlier book, Transitional Justice, Teitel makes the
point even more strongly, claiming that “only trials are thought to draw a
bright line demarking the normative shift from illegitimate to legitimate rule.”
Teitel distinguishes between criminal justice, historical justice, reparatory
justice, administrative justice, and constitutional justice. One main schism in
the debate has been the distinction between backward-looking and forwardlooking justice. See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 7.
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legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”(emphasis
added).11 Along the same lines, Rachel Kerr and Eirin Mobekk
define transitional justice as “the range of judicial and nonjudicial mechanisms aimed at dealing with a legacy of large-scale
abuses of human rights and/or violations of international
humanitarian law.”12 The International Center for Transitional
Justice (ICTJ), a leading nongovernmental organisation in the
field, stresses that transitional justice “seeks recognition for the
victims and to promote possibilities for peace, reconciliation and
democracy” (emphasis added).13 These broader definitions, then
see criminal prosecutions as relevant, but not as the only or even
the first measures to pursue. Moreover, transitional justice is
now seen as a driver of transition rather than only as
interventions that follow a transition.14 Its goals have become far
more ambitious and less easily reconcilable with each other.15
11 UN Report on Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies, 23 August, 2004, S/2004/616.
12 Rachel Kerr and Eirin Mobekk, Peace and Justice (Malden, MA: Polity Press,
2007), 3.
13 International Center for Transitional Justice, “What is Transitional Justice?”
www.ictj.org. Similarly, Martha Minow takes a more general approach, writing
that justice in transition amounts to replacing “violence with words and terror
with fairness.” Presumably the instrumentalities through which this may be
achieved are open. Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing
History After Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 2.
14 This issue has been addressed first and foremost in the case of Colombia.
See, for example, Jemima García-Godos and Knut Andreas Lid, Truth and
Reparation before the End of a Conflict - The case of Colombia, Oslo: NCHR Project
Report, No. 55, University of Oslo, 2008; Maria José Guembe and Helena
Olea, “No justice, no peace: Discussion of a legal framework regarding the
demobilization of non-state armed groups in Colombia.,” in Transitional Justice
in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice, eds. Naomi Roht-Arriaza
and Javier Mariezcurrena (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
120-142; Maria Paula Saffon and Rodrigo Uprimny, Uses and Abuses of
Transitional Justice in Colombia (Bogota: DeJusticia, 18 January 2007). See also
Special Issue on “Drivers of Justice,” Nordic Journal of Human Rights, guest eds.
Elin Skaar and Astri Suhrke (forthcoming June 2013).
15 See, generally, Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of
Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 30.1 (2008): 95-118.
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This trend is partly attributable to the proliferation of
supposedly “post-conflict” settings where violence in fact
continues. In such circumstances, an overzealous focus on
retributive justice may serve to sustain or even deepen the
schisms between the warring parties—as, for example, in
Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Northern Uganda.16
Another reason is the recognition that measures other than
formal criminal trials may serve similar if not identical purposes.
South Africa’s well-documented experience with its Truth and
Reconciliation Commission highlights one such option. Finally,
affected populations themselves often have non-legalistic views
of what justice requires. Conducting interviews in conflictaffected communities in Mozambique, South Africa and
Rwanda, Helena Cobban found that most people “speak about
burning matters of economic justice before they say anything
about seeking prosecutions, trials, or punishments of
wrongdoers.”17 Nevertheless, Teitel notes, “the question remains
whether there are any transitional justice baselines or any
threshold minimum beyond which historical, psychological, or
religious inquiry ought to be characterized as justice-seeking.”18
In the end, and as noted by Charles Villa-Vicencio, “both
traditional [African] and modern forms of restorative justice
prioritize the need to salvage and affirm the moral worth and
dignity of everyone involved.”19
Teitel has divided the conceptual and empirical
development sketched above into three major phases. Phase I,
16

Thoms, Ron, and Paris, “The effects of transitional justice mechanisms,”
32; Lars Waldorf, “Mass justice for mass atrocity: Rethinking local justice as
transitional justice,” Temple Law Review 79.1 (2006):1-88; Sverker Finnström,
“Reconciliation grown bitter? War, retribution and ritual action in northern
Uganda,” in Localizing Transitional Justice: Justice Interventions and Priorities after
Mass Violence, eds. Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 2010).
17 Helena Cobban, Amnesty after Atrocity? Healing Nations after Genocide and War
Crimes (Boulder, Co.: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 239.
18 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 89.
19 Charles Villa-Vicencio, Walk with Us and Listen: Political Reconciliation in Africa
(Washington D.C. : Georgetown University Press, 2009), 145.
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between the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold
War, was characterised by interstate cooperation, war crimes
trials and sanctions, as seen in the Nüremberg and Tokyo trials.
Phase II, the post–Cold War phase, coincided with the “third
wave of democratization.”20 This period saw diversification of
the formal mechanisms employed to bring about transitional
justice, including a series of non-legal mechanisms such as truth
commissions. The TJ discourse expanded from an almost
exclusive focus on legal responses, intended primarily to ensure
the rule of law, to a more diverse focus on “truth” and “justice,”
with reconciliation as a desired outcome.21
In Phase III, the current phase, - and as reflected in the
definition by Kerr and Mobekk (2007) - transitional justice has
become an established component of post-conflict processes.
Discussions of transitional justice frequently begin even before a
conflict has ended. A particular feature of this phase is an
increased interest in local or traditional processes of justice and

20

Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
21 See, for example, David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes, and Luc Huyse, eds.,
Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook (Halmstad, Sweden:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),
2003); Audrey R. Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, eds., Truth and
Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Phil Clark, The Gacaca courts, postgenocide justice and reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without lawyers, vol. XII
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); James L. Gibson, “Does
Truth Lead to Reconciliation? Testing the Causal Assumptions of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Process, ” American Journal of Political Science
48.2 (2004): 201-217; Jean Marie Kamtali, “The Challenge of Linking
International Criminal Justice and National Reconciliation: the Case of the
ICTR,” Leiden Journal of International Law 16.1 (2003): 115-133; Jeremy Sarkin,
“The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics,
Human Rights, Due process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing
with the Genocide,” Journal of African Law 45.2 (2001.): 143-172; Elin Skaar,
“Argentina: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation, ” in Roads to Reconciliation, eds.
Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen, and Astri Suhrke (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books,
2005), 157-175.
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reconciliation.22 Another feature of the third phase is
diversification of actors: in addition to local actors, including
ordinary citizens at the grassroots level, there has been a
proliferation of donors eager to contribute to a “justice
cascade.”23 Human rights and international legal norms are
increasingly cited by both academics and practitioners.24
The transitional justice literature was initially dominated
by legal scholars and political scientists, who tended to take a
narrow approach to the topic. More recent contributions from
philosophers, anthropologists, criminologists, sociologists,
historians, and psychologists, amongst others, have made the
field truly interdisciplinary. The debate has, as a result, become
increasingly complex. From a focus on retributive justice and the
rule of law, the discussion of transitional justice has broadened
to include other elements such as forgiveness, healing and
reconciliation. This increased diversity in the academic debate
reflects the increased diversity of practical approaches to
transitional justice on the ground.
The literature on transitional justice is full of claims
about the intended or desired impact of various processes.
Among the outcomes, justice, truth and reconciliation are cited

22

See, for example, Luc Huyse and Mark Salter, eds., Traditional Justice and
Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. Learning from African Experiences (Stockholm:
IDEA, 2008); Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf, with Pierre Hazan, eds.,
Localizing Transitional Justice: Justice Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence,
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010; Lars Waldorf, “Mass
justice for mass atrocity: Rethinking local justice as transitional justice,”
Temple Law Review 79.1 (2006): 1-88; Joanna R. Quinn, ed., Reconciliation(s):
Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2009).
23 See Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Justice Cascade: The Evolution
and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials,” Chicago Journal of International
Law 2.1 (2001): 1-33.
24 See, for example, Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink,
eds., The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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most frequently.25 Claims regarding the interrelationship
between these three have shifted over time. Justice and
reconciliation have been seen both as conflicting and as mutually
reinforcing. Likewise, publicly revealing the truth about past
abuses has been considered an obstacle to reconciliation
(especially in the short run) but also a prerequisite for
reconciliation (in the long run).26 Truth, in turn, has been viewed
as both an obstacle to and a prerequisite for justice.27

Diverse definitions of reconciliation
The focus on reconciliation in the field of transitional justice has
been present since the beginning of the so-called second phase.28
The aim of this section is to map out some of the numerous
approaches to understanding and defining reconciliation to
illustrate the many facets of this elusive concept. The aim is thus
not to come up with a working definition of the concept, as I do
not see the utility of aiming for one, universal definition.

25

Other desired outcomes include a strengthening of the rule of law, a more
stable peace, accountability, social reconstruction, a deepening of democracy,
and assurance that gross human rights violations will not happen again.
26 In the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, Madeleine Albright in 1994 argued that “establishing the truth
about what happened in Bosnia is essential to—not an obstacle to—national
reconciliation.” Cited in Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals
of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 30.1 (2008): 96.
27 In the 1980s and 1990s, there was “a suspicion that truth commissions are
likely to weaken the prospect for proper justice in the courts, or even that
commissions are sometimes intentionally employed as a way to avoid holding
perpetrators responsible for their crimes.” See Priscilla B. Hayner,
Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge,
2001), 86.
28 See Carol A.L. Prager, “Introduction,” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and
Concepts, eds. Carol A. L Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid
Laurier University Press, 2003), 1. Central early works on reconciliation
include Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After
Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998); and Mark Osiel, Mass
Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction,
1997).
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To begin with, reconciliation may be understood as a
moral, political or religious concept. Whereas reconciliation
previously has been “associated with the imperative of
compromise in the name of stability,” more recent scholarship
has associated reconciliation with “the long-term aspiration for
political community based on consent and shared norms.”29
Definitions of reconciliation range on a scale from “thin” to
“thick.” 30 On the thin side, reconciliation may be understood as
“nothing more than “simple coexistence”, in the sense that
former enemies comply with the law instead of killing each
other.”31 Thicker conceptions of reconciliation may include
elements such as forgiveness, mercy (rather than justice –
though sometimes also justice), a shared comprehensive vision,
mutual healing and harmony. Karen Bronéus defines
reconciliation broadly as “finding a way to balance issues such as
truth and justice so that the slow changing of behaviours,
attitudes and emotions between former enemies can take
place.”32 The thin criteria of reduced violence or absence of
violence are reasonably easy to observe, while the thick criteria
are harder both to define and to observe.
Reconciliation may be conceived as a goal or a process
or both.33 According to Susan Dwyer, “reconciliation is
fundamentally a process whose aim is to lessen the sting of a
tension: to make the sense of injuries, new beliefs, and attitudes

29

Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 105.
David A. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative
Framework,” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds. Carol A. L.
Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,
2003), 54.
31 Ibid.
32 Karen Brounéus, “Reconciliation and Development,” a paper read at
“Building a Future on Peace and Justice,” Nuremburg, 25-27 June, 2007, 3.
33 Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennink, “The Nature of Reconciliation as
an Outcome and as a Process,” in From conflict resolution to reconciliation, ed.
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 11–38.
30
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in the overall narrative context of a personal or national life.”34
This understanding of reconciliation applies to both the micro
and the macro levels. When it is defined as a process,
reconciliation may be thought of as top-down or as bottom-up.
Reconciliation may happen at different levels. At the
individual level, reconciliation must take place between the victim
and the offender/perpetrator.35 Unlike apologies or expressions
of forgiveness, which can be one-sided processes, reconciliation
requires mutuality. That is, there must be a process of direct
interaction between the victim and the perpetrator. The
perpetrator asks forgiveness; the victim grants forgiveness. At
the societal or national level, reconciliation may be understood as “a
societal process that involves mutual acknowledgement of past
suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and
behaviour into constructive relationships towards sustainable
peace.”36 There may be cases where reconciliation may be
psychologically impossible—at either the individual or group
level.37 Some authors make a parallel distinction between microand macro-level reconciliation, in which “the former typically
involves local, face-to-face interactions—say between two
friends—and the latter concerns more global interactions
between groups of persons, or nations, or institutions, which are
often mediated by proxy.”38 Group or national-level
reconciliation may also be referred to as either interethnic

34

Susan Dwyer, “Reconciliation for Realists,” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation:
Cases and Concepts, eds. Carol A. L. Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ont.:
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), 106.
35 Marc Forget, “Crime as Interpersonal Conflict: Reconciliation Between
Victim and Offender,” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds.
Carol A. L. Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 2003), 111-35.
36 Brounéus “Reconciliation and Development,” 5. On societal reconciliation
(a society reconciling with its past and groups reconciling with each other),
see also Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, chapter 10.
37 Dwyer, “Reconciliation for Realists,” 91-110.
38 Ibid., 93.
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reconciliation or political reconciliation, depending on the root
of the conflict.39
A number of elements are believed to play a critical role
in reconciliation, helping to “repair torn relationships between
ethnic, religious, regional or political groups, between
neighbours, and between political parties.”40 These essential
components of reconciliation vary depending on the level, the
type of conflict, and other factors. Acknowledgement,41 forgiveness,42
and healing43 may be particularly important at the individual level.
Remembrance of past violations has also been mentioned as a
prerequisite for reconciliation, at both the individual and the
39 See, for example, Claire Moon, Narrating Political Reconciliation: South Africa's
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2008).
See also Charles Villa-Vicencio, Walk with Us and Listen: Political Reconciliation
in Africa. (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009).
40 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 133.
41 “…[A]cknowledging… wrongs will assist victims to heal, will mark a
separation from the wrongdoings of the past and a commitment to reform,
and may constitute a first step towards reconciliation.” Trudy Govier, “
What is Acknowledgement and Why is it Important?” in Dilemmas of
Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds. Carol A. L. Prager and Trudy Govier
(Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), 84. See also Michael
R. Marrus, “Overview,” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds.
Carol A. L. Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 2003).
42 See, for example, Thomas Brudholm and Thomas Cushman, eds., The
Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009); Phil Clark, “The Rules (and Politics) of
Engagement: The Gacaca Courts and Post-Genocide Justice, Healing and
Reconciliation in Rwanda,” in After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict
Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, eds. Phil Clark and
Zachary D. Kaufman (London, Hurst, New York: Columbia University
Press, 2009); Quinn, Reconciliation(s).
43 See, for example, Cobban, Amnesty after Atrocity? See also Alcinda
Honwana, “Healing and Social Integration in Mozambique and Angola,” in
Roads to Reconciliation, eds. Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen and Astri Suhrke (Lanham,
Md.: Lexington Books, 2005); Kimberly A. Maynard, Healing Communities in
Conflict. International Assistance in Complex Emergencies (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999); Gearoid Millar, “Assessing Local Experiences of
Truth-Telling in Sierra Leone: Getting to ‘Why’ through a Qualitative Case
Study Analysis,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 (2010): 477-496.
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group/national levels.44 Another central element of
reconciliation is mutual respect, that is, willingness to judge people
as individuals and not brand them with group stereotypes.45
The next part spells out in more details the scholarly
claims connecting reconciliation to four central transitional
justice mechanisms: trials, truth commissions, reparations, and
local justice initiatives. It also provides illustrations of how these
claims are supported – or not – by empirical evidence.
What transitional justice is supposed to achieve: Scholarly
claims and empirical evidence

Trials and reconciliation: Claims and evidence
Claims
Claims regarding the positive role of trials in promoting
reconciliation are relatively recent. Until the late 1980s (and
based mainly on the Latin American experience), prosecutions
were considered anathema to the goal of securing peace, and
thereby reconciliation.46 Recent scholarship is more nuanced.
Today, many advocates of prosecution make the case that trials,
whether alone or in combination with other mechanisms such as
truth commissions, can contribute to peace, and hence
reconciliation. Mendeloff, for example, argues that the truth
telling that takes place during trials uncovers individualized
responsibility for crimes, which promotes group reconciliation.47
Others are more sceptical to the potentially
reconciliatory effect of trials. Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M.
44

“... [T]here can be no reconciliation without remembrance,” Marrus,
“Overview,” 29.
45 Gibson, “Does Truth Lead to Reconciliation?” 205.
46 The potential causal relationship(s) between peace and reconciliation is a
large scholarly debate and will not be ventured into here for reasons of time
and space. Note, however, that in the author’s opinion reconciliation forms
an integral part of what is frequently referred to as “positive peace”, i.e. a
‘thicker’ peace that goes beyond the mere absence of large-scale violence.
47 Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding,”
358-59.
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Weinstein caution that “the assumption that holding individuals
accountable for atrocities alleviates despair, provides closure,
assists in creating and strengthening democratic institutions and
promotes community rebuilding overstates the results that trials
can achieve.”48 According to these authors the causes of war
must be understood and addressed before social repair (which
reconciliation is defined as a part of) can be achieved. Placing
individual accountability does in their view not necessarily solve
the collective guilt problem. They stress “that the focus on
punishment of perpetrators may have the inadvertent
consequence of transforming these wrongdoers into scapegoats
or victims in order to perpetuate the political mythology of a
particular social group. This may exert an untoward effect that
undercuts the advantages of punishing perpetrators.”49
Other scholars, like Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri,
also suggest that prosecuting perpetrators of human rights after
periods of conflict may undermine peace and lead to renewed
violence or an increase in repression.50 Hunjoon Kim and
Kathryn Sikkink claim that in situations of civil conflict and war,
human rights prosecutions will exacerbate human rights
violations.51 Under these scenarios, trials may be detrimental to
reconciliation. Many argue that “digging up the past” in postconflict settings can trigger new tensions by provoking a
backlash on the part of those to be prosecuted – and hence limit
the possibilities for reconciliation. According to Leebaw, “the
criminalization of political violence is likely to be controversial
and potentially destabilising, whether this takes the form of
prosecution and punishment or the acceptance of state
48

Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, “Violence and Social Repair:
Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation,” Human Rights
Quarterly 24.3 (2002): 601.
49 Ibid., 592.
50 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice,” International Security 28. 3
(2004): 5-44.
51 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries,” 939–963.
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responsibility through official acknowledgement, apology, or
reparations.”52 Where wars have not yet ended, the prospect of
prosecutions many reduce leaders’ incentives to put down their
guns.53 Most sceptics do not entirely deny the potential benefit
of trials, but they urge a sequenced approach that postpones
legal punishment until peace is sufficiently established.54
Evidence
Although prosecution for gross human rights violations have
become more common over the last decade, empirical evidence
is inconclusive as to how and in which ways trials may
potentially influence reconciliation – be it at the individual,
societal or national levels.55 This is in part because too short
time has gone by for most of these trials to say anything sensible
about the potential impact on reconciliation, and in part because
it is difficult to trace the exact mechanisms whereby trials
influence the process of reconciliation. Finally, most trials are,
after all, conducted principally for other purposes than to
achieve reconciliation – like doing justice, correct wrongs of the
past, prevent future violations, establish a break with the past,
strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions etc.
This fact is reflected in the statistical studies that try to
gauge the effects of trials: none of the studies to date attempt to
measure the implications for “reconciliation” directly. Yet, they
52

Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 97.
For example, in the case of Northern Uganda, critics, including Ugandan
President Museveni, have argued that the arrest warrant against rebel leader
Joseph Kony by the International Criminal Court, has hindered peace
negotiations.
54 See Cobban, Amnesty after Atrocity?
55 At the beginning of the new millennium, successful prosecution of rights
abusers in countries in transition from authoritarian rule or after violent
armed conflict was still rare. A decade later, trials are taking place in a
growing number of countries, both in national courts and in international or
mixed tribunals. Yet there are even more examples of countries where trials
have been avoided altogether. There are a host of reasons why it may be
difficult to conduct trials, ranging from poorly functioning judicial systems to
scarcity of resources to weak political will or the presence of amnesty laws.
53
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try to measure impact on factors which in turn may influence
reconciliation. Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling, in
their analysis of all Latin American countries for the period
1979-2004, find that human rights trials have not undermined
democracy or led to an increase in human rights violations or
exacerbated conflict in Latin America.56 Expanding the universe
of cases beyond Latin America to include 100 transitional
countries across the world for the period 1980-2004, Kim and
Sikkink find that human rights trials help decrease repression
(defined as torture, summary execution, disappearances, and
political imprisonment) and hence have a positive effect on
human rights protection.57 In contrast to the two studies, Olsen,
Payne and Reiter, using 161 countries over 40 years (1970-2007),
find that trials alone do not have statistically significant and
positive effects on democracy and human rights.58
The case material detailing these statistical findings at the
country level is surprisingly scarce. The effects on reconciliation
of trials conducted in national courts seem to be particularly
understudied.59 Empirical studies aiming to show that trials
facilitate reconciliation between former warring parties (at the
societal or national level) are mainly based on UN sponsored
war crimes tribunals, or so-called mixed courts – in addition to a
large literature on the gacaca trials in Rwanda (see separate
treatment under section on local justice initiatives). There is in
fact now an emerging literature on the role of genocide trials
with respect to reconciliation. This may suggest (though I have
no proof) that different expectations are tied to genocide trials
than for other kinds of human rights trials conducted in national
courts.
56 Sikkink and Booth Walling, ”The Impact of Human Rights Trials in Latin
America,” 427. The authors have created a new dataset on truth
commissions and trials for past human rights violations. In this particular
article, they only explore the effects of trials.
57 Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries,” 939-963.
58 Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
59 In fact, I have come across no such study.
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), for example, was explicitly established to
help bring an end to the on-going conflict in the Balkans60 and
facilitate reconciliation. As Teitel explains, “It was hoped that
condemnation of ethnic persecution, together with individual
accountability, would transcend identity politics and advance a
shift towards a more liberal order.”61 Although the ICTY failed
in this respect,62 the argument remains relevant. By alleviating
collective guilt through the identification of discrete “bad guys,”
prosecution can cool the ardour for collective vengeance. On a
practical level, criminal punishment removes troublemakers and
deters future ones.63 Nevertheless, recent research on the ICTY,
which draws on fieldwork in Bosnia, proposes that “the linkage
between criminal trials and reconciliation is especially tenuous in
genocide cases.” Janine Natalya Clark questions the argument
that “genocide trials foster reconciliation by dealing with the
broader responsibility of bystanders, identifying those
individuals with genocidal intent and facilitating closure” and
cautions “against an over-reliance upon criminal trials.”64
This is a point that has been pushed by other scholars
earlier. In their edited collection on post-war social
reconstruction, Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein use qualitative
and quantitative studies to examine whether criminal trials in
post-genocide Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia served the
transitional goals they set out to achieve. They conclude that
“there is no direct link between criminal trials (international,
national, and local/traditional) and reconciliation… In fact, we
60

Launched under the Security Council’s Chapter 7 powers, the ICTY was
created to stop conflict. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22,
1993).
61 Ruti Teitel, “The law and politics of contemporary transitional justice,”
Cornell International Law Journal 38.3 (2005): 837-862.
62 See Fletcher and Weinstein, “Violence and Social Repair.”
63 Payam Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities?” American Journal of International Law 95.1 (2001):
12.
64 Janine Natalya Clark, “The ‘crime of crimes’: genocide, criminal trials and
reconciliation,” Journal of Genocide Research 14.1 (2012): 55-77.
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found criminal trials—and especially those of local
perpetrators—often divided small multi-ethnic communities by
causing further suspicion and fear.”65 Almost a decade later, indepth research on the legal responses to mass violence in
Rwanda concludes that “of the available methods of legal
redress in post-genocide Rwanda, the gacaca courts are most
effective in performing the function of reconciling trauma and
establishing collective memory.”66

Truth commissions and reconciliation: Claims and
evidence
Claims
Opinions have shifted as to whether or not truth promotes
reconciliation. Until quite recently, revealing the truth about
gross human rights violations was seen as an obstacle to
reconciliation, in that it could promote animosity, reopen old
wounds, and increase political instability. Currently, however,
“the idea that a durable peace requires countries to address past
violence is now widely held and promoted by influential leaders
and institutions under the broad heading of “transitional
justice.”’67 Truth commissions are expected to have an impact at
different levels.
Starting with the national or political level, the fact that a
government sets up a truth commission may in itself be
perceived as an effort to uncover crimes of the past, thus
publicly acknowledging that violence has taken place – which is
important for those who have suffered repression and violence.
Truth commissions have been seen as a way to promote political
65

Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, eds., My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice
and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 323.
66 Carla De Ycaza, “Performative Functions of Genocide Trials in Rwanda:
Reconciliation Through Restorative Justice? An Examination of the
Convergence of Trauma, Memory and Performance Through Legal
Responses to Genocide in Rwanda,” African Journal of Conflict Resolution 10.3
(2010): 9-28.
67 Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 96.
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reconciliation by fostering dialogue across lines of political and
social conflict.68 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue
that truth commissions can foster deliberative democracy, and in
turn reconciliation, by encouraging “accommodation to
conflicting views that fall within the range of reasonable
disagreement.”69 Reports issued by truth commissions may also
have a reconciliatory effect. According to David A. Crocker, “if
reconciliation in any... sense is to take place, there must be some
agreement about what happened and why.”70 The official,
authoritative historical record provided by truth commissions
may establish a “new shared history,” thus fostering group
reconciliation.71 One must note, however, with James L. Gibson,
that “a truth process pointing to unilateral blame is not likely to
produce reconciliation.”72 Another point articulated by Cavallaro
and Albuja, is that the mandates of truth commissions are too
limited to allow them to contribute effectively to the
consolidation of democratic regimes. Citing research that shows
a correlation between citizens’ experiences of corruption and
low public legitimacy of their governments, James Cavallaro and
Sebastian Albuja argue that it is necessary to address economic
crimes as well as civil and political ones in order to strengthen
prospects for reconciliation.73
68

Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, “The Moral Foundations of Truth
Commissions,” in Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, eds.
Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000), 41.
70 Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs.”
71 This argument and its logic are reviewed by Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking,
Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding,” 358.
72 James L. Gibson, “Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided
Nation?” Politikon 31.2 (2004): 149.
73 James Cavallaro and Sebastian Albuja, “The Lost Agenda: Economic
Crimes and Truth Commissions in Latin America and Beyond,” in Kieran
McEvoy and Lorna McGregor, eds., Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots
Activism and the Struggle for Change (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), 140. Their
point is made on the basis of the experience of the Liberia’s truth
commission, which did have a mandate to address corruption.
69
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Moving from the political to the societal and individual
levels, there are many and conflicting claims connected to the
process of truth telling itself. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter include
truth telling as one of four necessary mechanisms for achieving
reconciliation.74 Payam Akhavan asserts that “truth-telling
promotes interethnic reconciliation through the individualisation
of guilt in hate-mongering leaders and by disabusing the people
of the myth that adversary ethnic groups bear collective
responsibility for crimes.”75Along the same lines, truth telling is
believed to contribute to psychological healing of individual
victims and thus promotes social healing and group
reconciliation.76 Some claim that “truth telling demanded by
victims is essential for reconciliation.”77 Yet, this is not
uncontroversial as other scholars claim that truth-telling may
lead to re-traumatisation of the victims.
Not all scholars then view truth commissions favourably.
Many of the claims for the relationship between truth telling and
reconciliation in a context of peace building are flawed or at least
questionable. In David Mendeloff’s opinion, “truth telling
advocates claim more about the power of truth telling than logic
or evidence dictates.”78 To succeed in promoting reconciliation,
truth commissions must be managed in a sensitive way. While
truth telling can be considered a cornerstone of transitional
justice, it is also essential to recognize that “too much truthtelling can be counterproductive and instead of healing social
cleavages can generate more.”79

74

Huyse and Salter, Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict.
Payam Akhavan, “Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?
A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal,” Human Rights
Quarterly 20.4 (1998): 766.
76 This, according to Mendeloff, is one of the primary claims of the postconflict and peace-building literatures. Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, TruthTelling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding,” 358. See also Hayner, Unspeakable
Truths and Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness.
77 Prager, “Introduction,” 12.
78 Ibid. See also Gibson, “Overcoming Apartheid.”
79 Verwoerd 2003, cited in Prager, “Introduction,” 12.
75
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Empirical evidence
Many of the claims above are of course based on specific
country experiences with truth commissions. Although the
mandates of truth commissions vary widely, many have had
reconciliation as a specific end goal.80 Yet surprisingly few
scholarly studies have examined the impact of truth
commissions in general, and even fewer have examined their
impact on reconciliation in particular.81 This is also true for all
existing statistical studies. The picture portrayed by statistical
analysis of the impact of truth commissions more generally on
factors which may directly or indirectly impact on reconciliation
is mixed. Whereas Kim and Sikkink find that truth commissions
help decrease repression (defined as torture, summary execution,
disappearances, and political imprisonment) and hence have a
positive effect on human rights protection (and presumably
reconciliation), Olsen et. al. find that truth commissions in
isolation have a negative rather than the expected positive impact

80

This is reflected in the names of many commissions, such as the National
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (Chile); Commission for
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (East Timor); National Reconciliation
Commission (Ghana); National Commission for Truth and Justice (Haiti);
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Peru); Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (Sierra Leone); Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South
Africa); Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Serbia and Montenegro
(Yugoslavia).
81 Several studies that have attempted to analyze the impact of truth
commissions all conclude the same. See Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, TruthTelling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding,” and Hazan, “Truth-Seeking, TruthTelling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding” Two studies on truth commissions
that provide very useful insights, empirically as well as methodologically are
Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth,”; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth
Commissions and Transitional Societies. However, Wiebelhaus-Brahm’s (2007)
analysis of truth commissions in 78 countries from 1980-2003 reaches no
convincing conclusions regarding their impact on human rights protection
and democratic practice. He does not address the impact on reconciliation.
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on democracy and human rights, both in post-authoritarian and
in post-armed conflict contexts.82
These inconclusive findings are also reflected in the few
analytical impact studies that exist at the country level. The
methodologically stringent case studies on impact of truth
commissions on reconciliation in the African context are almost
exclusively from South Africa,83 giving skewed case-based
knowledge from the African continent. In Latin America, the
following cases have received the most scholarly attention: Chile,
Argentina, Guatemala, and Peru. For Asia, only East Timor
seems to have been subject to scholarly study focusing on the
links between truth commissions and reconciliation.
There are several reasons for this limitation in empirical
material. First, many truth commissions have been set up only in
the last few years, so that not enough time has passed to
effectively measure or assess their impact. Second, many of the
studies of truth commissions are based on moral conviction and
rely primarily on anecdotal evidence. Third, and most important,
much of the literature on truth commissions is limited to
descriptive narrative and lacks an analytical focus on results.
Studies that do attempt to gauge success or failure often stop
with the immediate reception of the commission’s report, rather
than assessing the long-term impact on goals such as
reconciliation.84
In the rest of this section I have decided to limit my
discussion principally to two case studies: South Africa and East
Timor. This for two reasons: (1) data availability and (2)
82

See Kim and Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries, ” and Olsen et al., Transitional Justice
in Balance.
83 Indeed, outside South Africa, there are hardly any individual-level data
analyses of reconciliation processes available. See Wiebelhaus-Brahm,
“Uncovering the Truth,” 20. A notable exception is recent work on the
healing potential of the Sierra Leone truth commission. See Millar, “Assessing
Local Experiences of Truth-Telling in Sierra Leone,” 477-96.
84 This point has been highlighted by several scholars on different occasions.
See, for example, Duggan, “Transitional Justice on Trial.”
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methodology. The substantial body of empirical evidence for
evaluating both the South African and East Timor experiences
with truth commissions’ impact on reconciliation gives a more
nuanced reading than for those countries for which there may be
only a single, or perhaps two, case studies that evaluate the truth
commission’s impact on reconciliation. Furthermore, these two
very different cases aptly illustrate some of the conceptual and
methodological dilemmas involved in evaluating the impact of
truth commissions on reconciliation. They also show how
scholars may arrive at very different conclusions with respect to
the same truth commission experience.
The impact of truth commissions: Lessons from South Africa
Of all truth commissions to date, it is the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that has most effectively
captured world public attention as well as provided a model for
subsequent commissions – in spite of the uniqueness of this
commission. Not surprisingly therefore, the TRC has by far the
most abundant data, assessed by South African as well as
international scholars.
To start off with, the TRC had a far more expansive
mandate than most truth commissions. Its task was to go
beyond truth finding to promote national unity and
reconciliation across social divisions, facilitate the granting of
amnesty to those who made full factual disclosure, restore the
human and civil dignity of victims by providing them an
opportunity to tell their own stories, and make
recommendations to the president on measures to prevent
future human rights violations. The TRC recognised multiple
types of truth—narrative, forensic, historical and social or
dialogic.85 It also recognised and made use of multiple
understandings of reconciliation. Evaluating the impact of the
85 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (Cape Town:
Juta and Company Ltd., 1998), vol. 1, chapter 5, cited in Erin Daly, “Truth
Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in Times of Transition,”
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2.1 (2008): 25.
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TRC on reconciliation has thus proved a complicated task for
scholars, who have arrived at strikingly different answers to the
question of whether the TRC produced truth that has
contributed to reconciliation.86 In the following I have selected
two comprehensive studies to illustrate how the application of
complementary methodologies may come to different
conclusions.87 Rather than view these two studies as comparing
“apples and pears,” as some scholars may object to, I find that
these studies jointly shed valuable light on the complexities
involved in gauging the impact of a truth commission on
reconciliation.
Based on rigorous analysis of individual-level data
collected in an extensive survey of 3,700 individual respondents,
beginning in 2001, James L. Gibson concluded that truth has
contributed to reconciliation in South Africa. “The truth and
reconciliation effort,” in his words, “was successful at exposing
human rights abuses by all sides in the struggle over apartheid—
thereby contributing to the country’s collective memory about
its apartheid past.”88 He added, however, that different racial
groups assess the truth generated by the TRC differently. A
majority of white, Asian and Coloured South Africans surveyed
said that truth contributed to interracial reconciliation. Among
black South Africans, however, truth seemed to contribute little
to reconciliation. Even though this may be a disappointing
finding, he writes, “in no instance is truth associated with
irreconciliation.”89
This raises an interesting question: Do truth
commissions lead to more reconciliation amongst the people
86

The issue of different types of truths produced by truth commissions (in a
comparative perspective) is addressed in Audrey Chapman and Patrick
Randall, “The Truth of Truth Commissions: Comparative Lessons from
Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala,” Human Rights Quarterly 23.1 (2001): 1-43.
87 James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004); Chapman and van der Merwe,
Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa.
88 Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid, 207.
89 Ibid., 214.
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who were not directly affected by a conflict by giving them a
deeper understanding of the past, even though no effect on
reconciliation is seen in victims or others who were directly
involved? If so, truth commissions may play a vital role in
reconciliation at the national level even while posing risks for
those on whom these processes depend.90 Gibson, however,
explicitly questions whether lessons from the South African
TRC apply elsewhere, given the particular circumstances of
apartheid. Gibson does not argue on the basis of this analysis
that truth inevitably leads to reconciliation. In his words, “the
most puissant characteristic of the collective memory created by
South Africa’s TRC was its willingness to attribute blame to all
parties in the struggle over apartheid... Another effective but
idiosyncratic element of South Africa’s truth and reconciliation
process was its emphasis on non-retributive forms of justice... A
different truth process might well have led to an entirely
different outcome.”91
A second in-depth study, by Audrey Chapman and Hugo
van der Merwe, provides a comprehensive evaluation of the
TRC process and its impact on South African society. Drawing
on an extensive analysis of the victim hearings, amnesty
hearings, institutional hearings, and public opinion survey data,
as well as on extensive interviews with a range of TRC staff,
people who worked with the commission, and members of
different communities affected by it, the authors raise
fundamental questions about the TRC and indeed about all truth
commissions. They question the capacity of such bodies to carry
out the mandates assigned to them and particularly to achieve
the difficult balance between truth finding and reconciliation. At
best, they argue, the South African TRC established only “an
incomplete truth,” which in turn may have had a negative impact
on reconciliation. Part of the problem rested with the failure of
90

Brounéus “Reconciliation and Development.”
James L. Gibson, “Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided
Nation?” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 603.82
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the commissioners to agree on what they meant by the “truth”
or whose “truth” should be documented and made public. In
addition, the TRC never defined precisely what it meant by the
term “reconciliation,” making any evaluation of impact very
difficult.
These authors also conclude that the TRC “effectively
put a hold on attempts to secure justice by survivors of human
rights abuses,” and thus the process “robbed survivors of justice
for over 1000 incidents of abuse.”92 They ask whether the work
of a truth commission may in fact deepen rather than close the
wounds of victims and survivors of gross human rights
violations, at least in the short term. And they stress the need to
distinguish between short-term and long-term effects on society,
including reconciliation.93 In short, even evaluations of the
model TRC in South Africa point to sharply different
conclusions on whether or the net impacts contribute to
reconciliation.
The impact of truth commissions: Lessons from East Timor/Indonesia
The Timor-Leste and Indonesian Commission of Truth and
Friendship (CTF) was established in 2005 to investigate the 1999
violence that erupted in connection with East Timor’s
declaration of independence from Indonesia. It completed its
final report in 2008. The commission’s stated goals were “to
conduct a shared inquiry with the aim of establishing the
conclusive truth about the reported human rights violations and
institutional responsibility, and to make recommendations which
can contribute to healing the wounds of the past and further

92

Chapman and van der Merwe, eds., Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa,
284.
93 See also Wilhelm Verwoerd, “Toward a Response to Criticisms of the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in Dilemmas of
Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds. Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier
(Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003), 245-78.
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promoting reconciliation and friendship and ensuring the nonrecurrence of similar events” (emphasis added).94
Though it may be too soon to evaluate the impact of this
commission on Timorese society, observers have drawn
attention to deficiencies in the process that have severely
reduced the chances for positive short-term or long-term impact
on reconciliation.95 A report from the ICTJ concluded that the
CTF was created not to ensure truth telling and reconciliation,
but rather as a means to stave off calls by the United Nations
and the larger international community to deal with the atrocities
through criminal justice processes. The UN boycotted the
commission because it considered it deeply flawed. The ICTJ
concluded that “the CTF has not yet delivered substantive
transitional-justice benefits, and its public hearings have
seriously compromised the goals of truth and reconciliation...
fundamental weaknesses in the Commission’s Terms of
Reference... were compounded by the poor design and
inadequate preparation of the public hearing process.”96 In
particular, the CTF’s terms of reference included a mechanism
for recommendations of amnesty while prohibiting
recommendations for new judicial processes. What this example
illustrates is that the political intentions behind a truth commission,
as well as the manner in which the truth commission hearings
are conducted, may be decisive for its impact on society.
To briefly sum, these selected case studies point to two
important issues relevant for impact assessment of truth
94

Final Report of the Commission of Truth and Friendship (Ctf) Indonesia - TimorLeste, ix; available from
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/Reparations/CTFReportEn.pdf;
accessed 27 June, 2012.
95 These points are taken from “Too Much Friendship, Too Little Truth:
Monitoring Report on the Commission of Truth and Friendship in Indonesia
and Timor-Leste,”—found in email from President Juan E. Méndez. The
monitoring report is accessible at http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJIndonesia-Commission-Monitoring-2008-English.pdf; accessed August 2011.
96 Megan Hirst, “Too Much Friendship, Too Little Truth: Monitoring Report
on the Commission of Truth and Friendship in Indonesia and Timor-Leste,”
(New York, NY: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2008), 1.
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commissions on reconciliation: The South African case
underlines the complexity of the concept and goal of
reconciliation. The East Timor/Indonesia case serves as a
cautionary example for assuming that all truth commissions can
be assumed to be productive, and thus have a positive impact on
reconciliation.

Amnesties and reconciliation: Claims and empirical
evidence
The claims
Amnesty, rather than prosecution, was the common response to
mass atrocity between the end of the Second World War and the
end of the Cold War. In spite of the world-wide increase in
criminal prosecution of past human rights violations, the
number of countries imposing amnesties for gross human rights
violations, either during peace negotiations or after the end of
violence, has in fact been growing in recent years.97 This implies
that amnesties are frequently accompanied by some form of
criminal accountability.
Indeed, amnesties have increasingly been considered a
transitional justice mechanism in its own, not only as an antithesis to prosecutorial justice. Prior to about 1990, it was
assumed that amnesties contributed to impunity rather than to
safeguard human rights.98 After the establishment of the ICC in
2002 and the spread of universal jurisdiction, there has been a
growing international legal trend against using amnesties for the
most serious crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide. Simultaneously, there has been a more
nuanced scholarly debate with respect to what purposes
amnesties may serve, especially in transitions from violent armed
conflict.

97 Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the
Peace and Justice Divide (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008).
98 See Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2.
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Amnesties have historically been used when
governments are either unwilling or politically unable to
prosecute alleged human rights violators after the political
transition to a democratic regime. Amnesties come in many
shapes and forms: self-amnesties, partial amnesties, blanket
amnesties etc.99An important point to note is that amnesties do
not necessarily foreclose all kinds of prosecution, as some crimes
or some kind of perpetrators may be excluded from the amnesty
law.
The main argument for amnesties is that they can, in the
short term, reduce political conflict and lessen the chances of
recurring violence, thereby fostering peace and reconciliation.
Amnesties have often been considered vital to secure transitions
from authoritarianism to democracy, or from armed conflict to
peace. As convincingly argued by Mark Freeman, “for societies
to regenerate after mass violence or genocide, there may, in fact,
be no other choice.”100 The transition itself is considered a
prerequisite for reconciliation to take place. More than anything
else, legal amnesties have been considered a tool to ensure
political stability, and thus a necessary measure to facilitate
reconciliation. Critics, however, counter that amnesty cannot
lead to long-term reconciliation, among other reasons because
“amnesia is the enemy of reconciliation.”101
Increasingly, scholars have started to argue for
combining amnesties with other measures. Mallinder contends
that amnesties can even have positive impacts “provided that
they are introduced in good faith and are accompanied by other
transitional justice mechanisms and institutional reforms.”102
When combined with truth commissions, amnesties may
99

Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions, 18. See pp. 3-7
for a comprehensive definition of amnesty, and the many types of amnesties.
100 Freman, Necessary Evils, 6.
101 Luc Huyse, “The Process of Reconciliation,” in Reconciliation after Violent
Conflict: A Handbook, eds. David Bloomsfield, Teresa Barnes, and Luc Huyse
(Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IDEA), 2003), 30.
102 Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions, 18.
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encourage the disclosure of more extensive information. This
information may, in the long run, be used for prosecutions and
hence promote justice, adding another element needed for
reconciliation.
Empirical evidence
The recent creation of data bases on amnesties has facilitated
some interesting statistical cross-country analysis. Olsen et al
(2010) find that amnesties used alone do not have statistically
significant and positive effects on “democracy” and “human
rights”. However, they show that amnesties in combination with
trials or truth commissions explain improvements in those two
political goals. This is a surprising finding given that trials and
amnesties are generally considered incompatible.103
Moving to single case studies, the subject of impact of
amnesties on reconciliation is an understudied topic. The cases
of postcolonial Angola, Mozambique, and post-Franco Spain,
where blanket amnesties for past crimes were issued but no
other formal mechanism was put in place to pursue truth, justice
or reconciliation after the end of civil war, seem to defy the rule
that collectively forgetting the past will open the way for
renewed conflict.104 Yet, this does not mean that societies have
become reconciled. For reasons of time and space I here limit
my very brief synopsis to these three countries. The question as
to how far these societies have reconciled with their past
remains open. Moreover, if they have reconciled, the question is
whether this is due to the presence of an amnesty law, or to local
justice processes that may have developed in the absence of
adequate state response to violence. Here the picture is certainly
mixed.
Angola has managed to secure a negative peace, but
though this has not been carefully documented using survey
material, there are reasons to believe that the country has a long
103

Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance.
See Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict
Peacebuilding,” 367.
104
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way to go in terms of reconciliation.105 Mozambique is often put
forward as a successful case of political reconciliation, but that
may be due to the implementation of a series of local
reconciliation practices rather than to the presence of an
amnesty law. The effectuation of reconciliation processes rooted
in local rituals and practices may have compensated for the
absence of government initiated transitional justice processes
(see more below). Spain too has recently revisited its violent past
through attempts at digging up mass graves from the Franco
fascist period, signalling that reconciliation is at best partial and
that people still have a need to know what happened in the past.

Local justice initiatives and reconciliation
Claims
Scholars of local justice practices in the context of political
transition emphasize the potential role of these practices, such as
ritual ceremonies, in promoting reconciliation among families
and communities – especially in the context of absence of
formal transitional justice mechanisms. In recent years, a large
and growing literature has developed on this subject. The main
general claims coming out of this burgeoning literature is that
civil society initiated processes aiming for some form of
restorative justice will help mend the social fabric after a society
has been torn apart by internal armed conflict or genocide.
Typically, rituals enacted to promote reconciliation directly
engage victims and perpetrators, contain elements of dialogue or
rites, aim at social inclusion rather than punishment, and are
ultimately aimed at making people who were former enemies
cope with living in the same community or society without
resorting to violence.
Empirical evidence
105

See Elin Skaar, Camila Gianella, and Trine Eide, “Angola: Peace but no
democracy in the shadow of impunity,” in Elin Skaar, Camila Gianella, and
Trine Eide, A way out of violent conflict: The impact of transitional justice on peace and
democracy. (manuscript under review with Intersentia, 2012).
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Lars Waldorf in 2006 observed that the literature that existed on
local justice included “mostly theoretical, macro-level
assessments of state-initiated mechanisms, rather than empirical,
micro-level studies of how those mechanisms are actually
functioning at the local level.”106 Since then, a lot of serious
empirical work has been undertaken that provides interesting
insights regarding how local justice practices may contribute to
reconciliation. The study of local justice practices has so far been
limited to individual case studies. It has not been subject to
systematic cross-country comparison, though there has been a
proliferation of edited volumes on local justice in the last couple
of years, some of them with a cross-regional focus.107 Yet, this is
probably the part of the transitional justice literature that has
brought the most valuable insights to the understanding of
reconciliation after periods of acute state-sponsored violence.
The vast bulk of literature on local justice practices and
reconciliation centre on African experiences (principally
Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Mozambique), though
local justice processes in countries such as East Timor,
Guatemala, Northern Ireland, and Israel-Palestine have also
attracted some scholarly attention. All of these studies take on a
micro-perspective, most of them are based on interview
material, and most study the idiosyncratic local justice processes
that are unique to each of the countries in question. Unlike
formal transitional justice mechanisms, which have become an
export “industry” where international funding and international
expertise has “transported” various transitional justice
mechanisms to virtually all corners of the world, local justice
practices are rooted in local experiences and are therefore not
immediately comparable. Since providing detailed analyses of
each case falls outside the scope of this article, this section
106

Waldorf, “Mass justice for mass atrocity,” 6.
See, among others, Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman, eds., After
Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda
and Beyond (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Huyse and Salter,
Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict; Shaw and Waldorf with
Hazan, Localizing Transitional Justice; Quinn, Reconciliation(s).
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simply draws attention to the variety of local justice practices
and points to some findings that may have implications for the
study of reconciliation. I have selected four country studies. Two
illustrate bottom-up approaches (Northern Uganda and
Mozambique) and two illustrate top-down approaches to local
justice (Rwanda and East Timor). The main themes linking these
cases are processes that aim to foster healing, forgiveness, and
social reintegration of perpetrators of violence.
Northern Uganda
In Northern Uganda, traditional Acholi conflict resolution
practices, particularly a process known as mato oput, is said to
assist the reintegration of ex-combatants, including abducted
children and “bush wives,” into their original societies. James
Ojera Latigo describes the process as follows:
Tolerance and forgiveness are enshrined in the principles of
mato oput and other associated rituals. … The process
recognizes and seeks to salvage and affirm the moral worth
and dignity of everyone involved—victims, perpetrators and
the community at large—in the pursuit of a decent society,
with the primary focus on coexistence and the restoration
of relationships between former enemies as a basis for the
prevention of the recurrence of gruesome crimes… The act
of slaughtering the goat and ram and exchanging the heads
reminds the perpetrators and those witnessing the
ceremony that there is a price to be paid for violating the
agreed rules of coexistence. Mato oput embodies the
principle that society and the perpetrator contribute to the
extent possible to the emotional restoration and repair of
the physical and material well-being of the victim.108
108

James Ojera Latigo, “Northern Uganda: tradition-based practices in the
Acholi region,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict:
Learning from African Experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm:
IDEA, 2008), 108. Latigo and Ali report similar rituals among the Mende in
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Latigo acknowledges that the Acholi justice system is not
suited to address war crimes or crimes against humanity, and it
therefore does not include the “LRA architects of terror” or, for
that matter, the Ugandan government within its remit.
Mozambique
In central Mozambique, according to research by Victor Igreja,
magamba spirit ceremonies in a community lead to reconciliation,
“since the spirits create conditions for reconciliation between
the living people, between the living and the spirits and among
the spirits themselves.”109
Igreja, who has observed the
magamba spirit ceremonies in central Mozambique for more than
a decade, claims that “socio-cultural processes such as those
presented by magamba spirits and healers and war survivors in
general in Gorongosa unequivocally demonstrate the potential
of human beings to utilize available mechanisms for a peaceful
resolution of war-related conflicts.”110 Alcinda Honwana, who
studied the role of therapeutic strategies and healing
mechanisms used in rural areas of Mozambique to deal with the
war, argues that “an acknowledgement of the atrocities
committed and the subsequent break from the past is articulated
through ritual performance.” Honwana concludes—contrary to
the assumptions underlying the processes of formal truth
commissions—that reconciliation may sometimes be more
efficiently achieved through symbols and rituals than through
words.111 From a more outsider’s macro-perspective, Helena
Leone,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from
African Experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm: International
IDEA, 2008), 44.
109 Victor Igreja, “Gamba Spirits and the Homines Aperti: Socio-Cultural
Approaches to Deal with Legacies of the Civil War in Gorongosa,
Mozambique,” a paper read at Building a Future on Peace and Justice,
Nüremberg, 25-27 June 2007, 12.
110 Ibid.
111 Alcinda Honwana, “Healing and Social Integration in Mozambique and
Angola,” in Roads to Reconciliation, eds. Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen, and Astri
Suhrke (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005).
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Cobban argues that the combination of official amnesty and
local reconciliation suits the unique nature of this country’s
conflict, in which many combatants, including children, were
forced to participate. Cobban reports from her interviews a
“very high level of general satisfaction in the ‘forgive, heal and
rebuild” policy that the government adopted in 1992.”112
Rwanda
Few countries in the world – if any – have dealt as extensively
with its genocidaires as Rwanda. The perpetrators of the genocide
have been dealt with through three sets of courts: The ICTR, the
national courts, and the local courts known as gacaca. Unlike the
traditional justice processes in Northern Uganda and
Mozambique that emerged out of civilians’ need to deal with a
traumatic past, gacaca in Rwanda are centrally managed at the
official political level. According to official claims, the process
known as gacaca was meant to “put the genocide behind us”
rather than end impunity as such.113 Scholars differ widely in
their assessments of the potential of gacaca, but the balance of
early evidence on impact indicates that it is unlikely to
accomplish either of these goals.
Waldorf, critically assessing the impact of the gacaca
courts on the goals of retributive justice and reconciliation,
reported in 2006 that a one-sided focus on Hutu crimes during
the genocide had deepened, rather than smoothed, ethnic
divisions.114 Almost half of all Hutu men can be considered
genocide suspects, following accusations and confessions in
gacaca proceedings.115 A good number of those have been
deprived of their right to vote.116 Some have been detained for
more than 10 years. Waldorf also noted that for the period he
112

Ibid., 193.
Cited in Waldorf, “Mass justice for mass atrocity,” 50.
114 Ibid., 75. In fact, in April 2005, more than 6500 Hutu fled Rwanda,
reportedly for fear of being killed in revenge for being named in gacaca.
115 Estimates range from 700,000 to 1 million genocide suspects. Ibid., 80.
116 Following convictions of category 1 or 2 crimes, according to the Gacaca
law.
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examined, perpetrators who confessed rarely showed remorse,
and they often received light sentences. Therefore, argued
Waldorf, it was unlikely that gacaca would contribute to a sense
of justice among survivors. In fact, as one Rwandan psychologist
noted, “Confessions and seeking forgiveness do not remove
fears and anger—they even increase them.”117 Waldorf too
observed that “in several communities, pre-trial gacaca
proceedings caused a worsening of interethnic social relation”
and cautioned that we should lower expectations with respect to
what local justice – indeed any kind of transitional justice – can
reasonably be expected to accomplish after mass atrocity.118
Along the same lines, although slightly less critical, Trine Eide,
based on her in-depth knowledge of Rwandan culture,
concluded that under the apparent mask of peaceful coexistence,
both Hutus and Tutsis perceived the gacaca processes as imposed
by the government. What Rwandans at the grassroots level say
with respect to reconciliation is different from what they feel in
their hearts.119
Some of this pessimism has over time given way to
cautious optimism as the gacaca proceedings have unfolded in
almost 9000 gacaca courts across the country. In the view of
Clark, a prominent specialist on gacaca, “critics have ignored
gacaca’s capacity to facilitate restorative justice via meaningful
engagement between parties previously in conflict, in the form
of communal dialogue and cooperation, which are crucial to
fostering reconciliation after genocide.” Based on careful
empirical analysis, Clark finds reason for “qualified optimism
regarding gacaca’s contribution to justice, healing and
reconciliation after the genocide.” Still, he thinks it is too soon
to pass a final judgment on these processes.120
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Ibid., 74, full reference note 439.
Ibid., 75 and 86.
119 Trine Eide, Pretending peace: discourses of unity and reconciliation in Rwanda, M.A.
Thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen, Norway,
2007.
120 Clark, “The Rules (and Politics) of Engagement,” 300-301.
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East Timor
Like Rwanda, East Timor too has opted for a top-down
approach in an attempt to facilitate reconciliation among former
warring parties. Recent violence between groups in the east and
west of East Timor as well as on-going tensions with Indonesia
suggest that reconciliation at the national and international levels
remains elusive.121 The Commission for Reception, Truth and
Reconciliation (CAVR) also initiated a continuing CommunityBased Reconciliation Process (CRP) that deals with minor
offences. The record of that program is mixed. According to a
program review published in 2004:
While [the CRP] has resolved some problems and facilitated
the integration of many deponents back into their
communities it has raised a host of new issues that are left
unresolved. ... The voluntary nature of the process has
meant that only some deponents have participated in the
process, leading to resentment amongst victims and
deponents alike of those who have not yet come forward…
More critically, the CRP has inadvertently ‘stirred the pot’
with respect to serious crimes issues, raising expectations
that the ‘big fish,’ some of whom are perceived to be living
back in the community, will now be investigated and
prosecuted. Indeed, while serious crimes issues remain
unresolved, it is perhaps premature for many to
contemplate questions of ‘community harmony’.122
Observers have noted that local practices adopted into the
transitional justice strategy have tended to reinforce pre-existing
power structures. Survivors frequently deferred to the village
head’s opinion with respect to punishment, and in some cases
121

I have written a section on East Timor/Indonesia under the heading of
truth commissions as well as under the heading of local justice initiatives
above since they have not been treated together in the literature.
122 Judicial System Monitoring Program, “Unfulfilled Expectations:
Community Views on the CAVR’s Community Reconciliation Process,” Dili:
East Timor, 2004, 40.
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the fear of retribution prevented people from requesting stiff
sanctions or from speaking out at all. Within the CVAR itself,
there was evidence that staff members exercised bias to protect
family members who were known perpetrators from
punishment.123
To sum up, while local justice practices such as the ones
depicted above may promote reconciliation within a given
community, they usually do not apply to divisions at the national
level. In three of the countries mentioned (Northern Uganda,
Mozambique, and East Timor), the practices were used only
within specific ethnic groups or specific regions. Since war
typically brings the mixing of groups and heightens conflicts
between them, such local practices are not suitable for settling
many types of disputes. For instance, among the East Timorese,
reconciliation—what is termed locally nahe biti, or stretching the
mat—is perceived as “embracing not only the notion of
meeting, discussion and agreement in order to reach a consensus
among the opposing factions… it is also part of a grand process
that aims to link the past and the future and bring society into an
ultimate state of social stability, where peace, tranquillity, and
honesty prevail.”124 But as implemented in the CommunityBased Reconciliation Process, it explicitly targeted only smalltime criminals.125 In Rwanda, by contrast, those involved in the
genocide were treated an all three sets of courts, depending on
their level of involvement and command. The achievements of
the gacaca should therefore ideally be explored in the context of
the existence of three sets of courts three seeking justice and
truth/prosecution, and the inherent tensions between them.
123 Elizabeth Stanley, “The Political Economy of Transitional Justice in
Timor-Leste,” in Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle
for Change, eds. Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2008), 184.
124 Dionísio Babo-Soares, “Nahe Biti: Grassroots Reconciliation in East
Timor,” in Roads to Reconciliation, eds. Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen and Astri
Suhrke (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 225.
125 Stanley, “The Political Economy of Transitional Justice in Timor-Leste,”
182.
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Tensions between transitional justice mechanisms and
reconciliation
Despite claims regarding the positive effects of various TJ
mechanisms on reconciliation, the traditional view of transitional
justice as a threat to national reconciliation has not been refuted.
Because “truth commissions and criminal tribunals investigate
extremely divisive and violent histories,” writes Bronwyn Anne
Leebaw, “they have often been viewed as obstacles to
reconciliation and charged with “opening old wounds,”
generating political instability and interfering with forwardlooking political change.”126 Since these mechanisms have also
been promoted as vehicles for reconciliation, the debate has
focused on tensions, trade-offs and dilemmas associated with
transitional justice. In the 1990s, the dominant perspective was
of a forced choice between truth (seen as a second-best option)
and justice (the preferred option).127 More recent scholarship has
portrayed truth and justice as mutually dependent and mutually
reinforcing. The dominant current view is that societies seeking
reconciliation should employ a variety of transitional justice
mechanisms rather than just one – echoing what Fletcher and
Weinstein (2002) suggested a decade ago.128 Proponents of this
126

Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 96-97.
Robert I. Rotberg, and Dennis Thompson, eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality
of Truth Commissions (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2000). Hayner argues forcefully that truth commissions should not be seen as
a replacement for prosecutions, that is, not as a second-best or weaker
option. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, chapter 7.
128 For instance, Crocker, in “Reckoning with Past Wrongs,” argues that
societies seeking reconciliation in the wake of serious wrongdoings should
strive to (1) investigate the truth about the relevant past events, (2) provide a
public platform for victims to tell their stories about what happened to them,
(3) establish some measure of accountability and appropriate sanctions for
the most significant perpetrators of wrongdoings, (4) comply, and show
compliance with, the rule of law, (5) appropriately compensate the victims of
wrongdoing, (6) contribute to institutional reform and long-term
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view assume that different transitional justice mechanisms can
be mutually reinforcing and complementary, contributing jointly
to the goal of reconciliation.
Leebaw, however, makes a strong case that more
attention should be given to their irreconcilable goals. Referring
to the political role of transitional justice mechanisms, she
contends that “their efforts to expose, remember, and
understand political violence are in tension with their role as
tools for establishing stability and legitimating transitional
compromises.”129 Thus, the debate has not yet reached a
conclusion. We agree with Brounéus that “claims made of the
relationship between for example truth, justice, peace and
reconciliation are in need of empirical backing.”130

The impact of mixed approaches on reconciliation:
Empirical evidence
Although many countries have employed two or more
transitional justice mechanisms in combination, hardly any
empirical qualitative cross-country comparative analysis exists on
the complementary or contradictory effect of these mechanisms
on the process(es) of reconciliation. Another key issue which
seems to be seriously underplayed in the literature is how the
timing and sequencing of TJMs may affect reconciliation in the
short term and the long term. Those who have dealt with
systematic cross-country evaluation of the impact of various
transitional justice mechanisms have avoided the concept of
reconciliation altogether. Instead, the steadily increasing number
of statistical studies published in recent years has attempted to
gauge the impact of TJMs on more measurable concepts such as
“peace”, “democracy” and “human rights” – all of which may
relate to, but are different from, reconciliation. Three of the todate four existing statistical studies (which I have referred to
129

For a good overview of the changing ideas about the relationship between
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earlier in this article) deal with the joint effects of two or more
of the transitional justice mechanisms examined here (truth
commissions, trials, and amnesties). I find it useful to provide a
very brief summary of their main findings here, since these
studies have advanced the TJ field methodologically and may
provide insights useful for assessing the impact of transitional
justice on reconciliation in future studies.
In an early attempt to evaluate the impact of transitional
justice mechanisms, Lie, Binningsbø and Gates find that the
impact of multiple transitional justice mechanisms on the
duration of post–civil war peace in general is weak.131 Kim and
Sikkink, by contrast, find empirical support for claiming that
human rights trials as well as truth commissions help decrease
repression and hence have a positive effect on human rights
protection.132 In the largest and most comprehensive crosscountry study of transitional justice to date, Olsen, Payne and
Reiter find that single TJ mechanisms used alone do not have
statistically significant and positive effects on democracy and
human rights.133 By contrast, the authors show that specific
combinations of mechanisms—trials and amnesties; or trials,
amnesties, and truth commissions—explain improvements in
those two political goals. Notably, they find support for a
combination of two TJ mechanisms—trials and amnesties—that
are generally considered incompatible. They contend that trials
provide accountability and amnesties provide stability, leading to
improvements in democracy and human rights. Another
interesting finding is that truth commissions have a positive
impact when combined with trials and amnesties. These findings
are true across different kinds of contexts.

131

Lie et al., “Post-Conflict Justice and Sustainable Peace.” Lie et al.
understand peace as negative peace, i.e. the absence of civil war. We may take
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To sum up, these three statistical studies produce very
different findings with respect to the impact of trials and truth
commission on “peace”, “democracy” and “human rights”. The
only study that assesses the impact of amnesties, views amnesties
positively when combined with truth commissions and trials.
The lesson drawn from these studies, relevant for studies of
reconciliation, is that one is likely to arrive on very different
conclusions when using different definitions/understandings of
the dependent variable. This is, of course, a methodological
problem inherent in the social sciences. Yet, our hunch is that
the concept “reconciliation” poses particular problems for crosscountry analysis.
The potential for carrying out studies of multiple
transitional justice mechanisms on reconciliation is certainly
there. Several countries have employed so-called mixed
approaches to reconciliation, combining two or more
transitional justice mechanisms. Limiting the countries to those
that have employed two or more of the four examined in this
article, we end up with the following non-exhaustive list: Chile
(truth commission and amnesty, later trials); Argentina (truth
commissions, trials and amnesty); Brazil (amnesty, later truth
commission); Uruguay (amnesty, later truth commissions and
trails); Peru (amnesty, truth commission, later trials); Guatemala
(amnesty, truth commission, later trials, local justice processes);
the former Yugoslavia (international war crimes tribunal,
national trials); Rwanda (international war crimes tribunal,
national trials, gacaca process); Uganda (International Criminal
Court and local reconciliation mechanisms); Sierra Leone (truth
commission, trials, Kpaa Mende rituals); Mozambique (amnesty,
magamba rituals); East Timor/Indonesia (national trials, UNsponsored trials, national truth commission, international truth
and friendship commission, nahe biti local justice initiatives).
Methodological challenges and recommendations for
future research
As more and more countries make use of transitional justice
mechanisms to deal with a violent past, there is an urgent need
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for reliable empirical evidence on the effects such mechanisms
are likely to have. As the cases of South Africa and Rwanda
illustrate, identifying effects is not easy, even in countries that
have been studied extensively. Yet it would be a mistake to rely
on assumptions about presumed effects rather than on
knowledge we can glean from experience to date.
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the concern
with impact assessment and appropriate methodology in the
transitional justice field is of relatively recent origin. I support
authors who advocate the use of social science techniques to add
more rigour to transitional justice analysis.134 Using what we do
not know as a point of departure, I suggest that at least three
different areas pertaining to reconciliation need systematic
scholarly attention. Research priorities include:
• More in-depth studies of single cases employing two or
more TJ mechanisms, looking at how these interact and
affect the process of reconciliation.
• More systematic qualitative comparative cross-country
analysis exploring the impact of the same combination
of TJ mechanism(s) on reconciliation processes.
• More systematic qualitative analysis of the interplay
between formal TJ processes and local/traditional
reconciliation processes.
For all three scenarios, specific attention should be given to the
different
contexts
in
which
these
transitional
justice/reconciliation processes play out. My hunch is that
formal as well as informal transitional justice mechanism will be
more explicitly geared towards facilitating reconciliation in
contexts of armed conflict/mass violence than in postauthoritarian situations simply because the level of interpersonal
violence may be assumed to be on a substantively smaller scale
in authoritarian regimes.
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To advance empirical knowledge on reconciliation, there
must therefore be more systematic attention to research design.
The major challenges may be grouped into four categories,
namely, concepts, causal connections, appropriate methods, and
time frames.
How to investigate reconciliation
I propose that reconciliation should be understood as a process
rather than as a goal. This first and foremost because it seems
impossible to conclude in any given empirical situation that an
individual or a society is fully reconciled. More usefully, I think,
reconciliation could be thought of as a continuum, ranging from
“thin” to “thick”. David Crocker’s three-fold typology may be a
useful starting point. He distinguishes between “simple coexistence” (i.e. low levels of reconciliation), “democratic
reciprocity” (i.e. intermediate levels of reconciliation) and a
comprehensive reconstruction of social bonds between victims
and perpetrators.135
For stringent cross-country analysis there should be a
minimal (“thin”) or intermediary rather than maximal (“thick”)
definition so that the reconciliation process can be measured by
observable phenomena such as reduced levels of violence and
increased levels of civic trust. For in-depth case studies, by
contrast, it may be more useful to study the process of
reconciliation as taking place at multiple levels (the individual,
the societal, the national). As existing research suggests,
understandings of reconciliation are highly context-specific and
may differ from one group to another within the same country.
It is important to pay attention to those differences if we want
to gain a deeper understanding of reconciliation processes.
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Concepts and causal connections
In any analysis it is essential to clarify the independent variables
postulated to have an effect on reconciliation. It matters whether
we look at the impact of transitional justice mechanisms on
reconciliation, or whether we focus on the relationships between
“truth” and/or “justice” (both of which may be brought about by
a range of different formal and informal transitional justice
mechanisms) on reconciliation. Starting with the latter, the
concept of “justice” has generated an expansive set of
subcategories: forward-looking justice, backward-looking justice,
retributive justice, restorative justice, retroactive justice,
reparatory justice, administrative justice, local justice, traditional
justice, historical justice, and more. Each term has different
content and connotations. Local perceptions of what justice
means will probably display even more variance than the
collection of terms listed above. Any rigorous study must
carefully delimit the particular concept of justice and the
mechanism used for the cases considered. “Truth” is another
problematic concept needing clarification and operationalization.
As demonstrated in the South African case, it matters what kind
of truth and whose truth is the focus of analysis.
Turning to the transitional justice mechanisms, it is
particularly important to determine through comparative analysis
the precise criteria that define each mechanism, rather than
presuming that all mechanisms called by the same name are
comparable. In the case of truth commissions, for example,
there is clear agreement that South Africa’s TRC, established to
investigate decades of violence under the apartheid system,
belongs on the list. But what about the Greensboro Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, set up in the U.S. state of North
Carolina in 2004 to look a specific episode of killings by the Ku
Klux Klan in 1979? Or Uruguay’s small, underfunded, NGOinitiated truth commission? Are we talking about a single
mechanism in all three cases? Similarly, when discussing the
impact of punitive justice or trials on the recovery of “truth” and
“justice”, can a trial of selected junta members by national courts
(as in Argentina) be sensibly compared with the thousands of
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prosecutions taking place in the gacaca processes in Rwanda, or
in the UN ad hoc tribunal set up for that country? I leave these
questions unanswered, but they illustrate the choices that must
be made in any cross-country comparative study.
In the transitional justice literature, concepts such as
truth, justice and reconciliation, in addition to carrying a
multiplicity of meanings, are often treated simultaneously as
independent variables and dependent variables. This ambiguity
obviously complicates the task of establishing causal
connections. An important and related challenge is to clarify
whether we are “measuring” the impact of a given transitional
justice mechanism at the individual, community, regional or
national level.
Deciding on an appropriate scientific method
Using interview or survey data is the most fruitful way of gaining
in-depth understanding of the multiple layers of reconciliation
processes. For in-depth cross-country analysis there is an
additional need for more easily accessible quantifiable or
operational measures. There is much room for additional
investigation of what combination of methods may be most
fruitful.
Determining the appropriate time frame for analysis
If the study focuses on the effects of specific transitional justice
mechanisms on reconciliation, the minimum time frame is set by
the prerequisite that the TJ mechanism in question must have
completed its mandate. Trials must have been conducted in a
timely fashion, with fair procedures. Truth commissions must
have completed their work and issued a report. Moreover,
implementation of the recommendations made by truth
commissions with respect to reparations, institutional reforms
and memorials (an additional set of TJ mechanisms not
discussed in this article) should also be considered, an important
point that is frequently overlooked in the literature.
All this points to the need to allow sufficient time for
analysing the impact of (formal and informal) transitional justice
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mechanisms on reconciliation processes. Trials, truth
commissions and local justice initiatives may take years to
complete; amnesty laws may be passed only to later be modified
or overturned; and there is frequently an additional time lag
between the publication of truth commission recommendations
and their implementation. Reconciliation processes inevitably
and indisputably take time. While the need to wait for results
before making a firm evaluation may be seen as an obstacle, it is
also an opportunity. That is, there is the possibility of beginning
research at a stage when it is possible to capture the dilemmas
and dynamics of formulating and implementing transitional
justice strategies, even though the final effects cannot yet be
measured.
Concluding remarks
From this overview, we conclude that no scholarly agreement
exists regarding the expected impact of transitional justice
mechanisms on the process of reconciliation. Empirical evidence
on the extent to which truth commissions, trials, amnesties and
traditional justice approaches actually contribute to
reconciliation is, at best, inconclusive.
I agree with Thoms, Ron and Paris that “moving from
‘faith-based’ to ‘fact-based’ discussions on transitional justice will
require more sustained, careful, and comparative analyses of the
transitional justice record.”136 This will require a combination of
rigorous comparative thick descriptive analysis and richly
detailed case studies employing a long time perspective. I join
Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm in advocating a multi-method approach
and broad definitions of impact, such as “whether the
experience [e.g., a truth commission] resulted in substantive
change.”137 Large-N analysis thus seems particularly unsuited to
shed light on the complex and elusive reconciliation processes.
136 Oskar N.T. Thoms, James Ron, and Roland Paris, “State-Level Effects of
Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?” International Journal of Transitional
Justice 4.3 (2010): 329-354.
137 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth,” 18. In this article,
Wiebelhaus-Brahm deals with impact of truth commissions on subsequent

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 54-103

Published by Scholarship@Western, 2013

49

Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 10

103 Reconciliation in a Transitional Justice Perspective

While tentative assessments are both possible and
necessary, the greatest challenge will be to let sufficient time
elapse before passing (final) judgement. As I am reminded by
the recurring debates on the Holocaust and the Armenian
genocide, the exhumations of mass graves in Spain, and the
ongoing post-transition trials in countries like Argentina, Chile,
and Uruguay, reconciliation may take decades—even
generations.

human rights practices and democratic development, yet we find many of his
theoretical points relevant to the challenges of assessing impact on
reconciliation.
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